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The Impact of National Socialist Policies upon Local City Planning in Pre-war
Germany (1933-1939): The Rhetoric and the Reality
John Robert Mullin
This paper is a review and analysis of the influence of the national government upon local city
planning during the pre-war years of National Socialism (1933-1939). The paper begins with a
brief overview of the critical aspects of city planning during both the Wilhelmian years (18711918) and the Weimar era (1918-1932). These aspects are reviewed in the context of their
contributions to the city planning profession in general and to the German experience in particular.
The paper then reviews the influence of ideology on city planning activities and follows with an
explanation of the “state of the city” at the time the NSDAP came to power. The section on
ideology precedes the “state of the city” section because most of the National Socialist (NSDAP)
ideological stances were developed before the government came to power. A description and
analysis of the bureaucratic framework and the city planning aspects of both the Recovery Years
(1933-1936) and the NSDAP First Four Year Plan (1936-1939) is then presented. Finally, the
paper concludes with an analysis and summary of the impact over time of the NSDAP supported
city planning experience.

The coming to power of the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP)
in Germany in 1933 resulted in a radical shift in the direction, approaches, and concepts
used in city planning activities across the German nation. The ability of each city to
define and solve its own planning problems was significantly lessened. In effect, city
planning was reduced to pat formulas and standards, and became subject to the
imposition of national ideology and national government control.1 The net result of these
changes was that localized city planning increasingly became subject to national goals,
needs, and programs. This article describes, analyzes, and interprets the impact of this
shift on city planning activities and examines the nationally supported theories,
principles, concepts, and enactments imposed between 1933 and 1939. There are two
basic premises to the article. First, that despite the shift in policies and standards, the
results of National Socialist city planning activities were not significantly different from
those of the Weimar era (1918-1933). Second, that economic needs and military
requirements in the city took precedence over both the NSDAP platform and nationally
supported ideologies. In time these contributed to the inability of local city planners to
meet the needs of their client citizens.
The article begins with a brief overview of the critical aspects of city planning
during the Weimar era. The “state of the city” at the time that the NSDAP came to power
is then summarized. Following this, the article focuses upon the immediate measures
taken by the new government to overcome the extreme economic and social problems
that were inherited from the Weimar Government. This section includes a review of both
the pragmatic actions and the theoretical – ideological basis for them. A description and
analysis of the bureaucratic framework and the city planning aspects of both the
Recovery Years (1933-1936) and the First Four Year Plan (1936-1940) is then
presented.2 Finally, the investigation concludes with an analysis and summary of the
impact over time of the NSDAP supported city planning experience.

Antecedents – the Weimar Republic (1918-1933)
German city planning during the years of the Weimar Republic has been
considered by historians and practitioners as making a major contribution to the evolution
of modern city planning in the western world.3 In a city planning context, the Weimar
years can be subdivided into three distinct periods. The first, 1918-1924, was marked by
political revolution, social unrest, and economic chaos. While it was a period of
extensive cultural ferment and utopian thought, little city planning was actually
undertaken.4 Priorities centered instead upon providing basic shelter, food, and jobs.
The second period, 1924-1929, however, saw extensive innovative city planning activity
as many of the theoretical ideas developed during the early 1920s began to be applied. In
particular, new concepts concerning urban decentralization, socialized housing,
regionalization, and urban design were integrated into planning efforts.5
These years saw a greater involvement by the Weimar government in city
planning matters than in the period 1918-1924. In particular, the nationally sponsored
house mortgage revaluation program (the Hauszinssteuer) provided the funding necessary
to undertake city planning activities. Further, the national government approved of the
creation of regional planning agencies and created a housing/city planning research
institute. Still, it would be a mistake to assume that the problems of the city were a high
priority for the national government. They simply were not. The net result was that the
cities continued to plan for themselves without significant national input. The national
government only began to focus on urban problems when the cities became virtually
bankrupt during the depths of the Depression.
The third period, 1928-1933, saw the collapse of the Republic. City planning, as
a major governmental activity, became virtually non-existent. Continually expanding
unemployment and welfare roles, ruinous taxation, fixed capital costs, and little private
investment were crucial causes.6 The soup kitchens and the fop houses of the immediate
post World War I era again became commonplace. Further, the increasingly conservative
political climate of city chambers brought dramatic changes to city planning activities.
Key members of the avant-garde, including the city planners Ernst May (Frankfurt),
Martin Wagner (Berlin), and Bruno Taut (Magdeburg), left the country.7 Soon after,
most of their colleagues were forced to resign and were replaced by more conservative
and more politically acceptable planners.
The major planning projects supported by the Weimar Government that were
undertaken during the early 1930s centered upon three objectives: (1) expansion of the
food supply; (2) expansion of inexpensive housing; and (3) assistance to urban residents
so they could become increasingly self sufficient. These projects had many elements in
common with the settlement ideas of the increasingly powerful NSDAP. Among these
were the emphasis upon non-urban settlements, “man and nature”, increased agricultural
production, and economic self sufficiency. Yet, these projects were scorned by the
NSDAP. How, asked the Party, could people find work in a decentralized locality with
little money and with farm lots that could result in personal food stuffs and little else?
Some of this criticism was well founded. In fact, the program was greatly revised when
the new government came to power.
In sum, city planning during the Weimar Republic was largely a localized
activity. The national government provided essential enabling legislation and a funding

mechanism but little else. The theories and ideologies that formed the basis for the
planning activities were largely created by organizations and people outside of the
national government. The application of the ideas and concepts was dependent upon the
innovativeness, skill, interest, and political strength of city-based administrators. The
ability of these administrators to take independent action, a long standing tradition in
Germany, was significantly curtailed with the formation of the Third Reich.
The New Government – The NSDAP Comes to Power
The turmoil of the early 1930s had certain parallels with the Germany of 1919. In
both cases, the various governmental institutions failed to meet the fundamental needs of
the public or to prevent a collapse of the national economy. The responses to these
problems by the two governments were, however, quite different. The Weimar
Government, beset by revolution from within and international economic sanctions from
without, was forced to look primarily to its own survival and to attempting to restore
order. Solving the problems of human needs became, by default, the responsibility of the
cities. Only once a sense of order was restored did the national government become a
critical participant in local matters. Even then, the expansion of national policies and
laws was oriented more to expanding local powers than to the direct participation of the
national government.
The coming to power of the NSDAP in January 1933 resulted in a radically
different approach. The NSDAP, from its first day in power, began to respond to the
basic economic problems facing the nation. The two key approaches focused upon the
need to redefine the role of governmental institutions and to provide a national planning
system and programs to meet the needs of the state as defined by the NSDAP.
Foremost among the governmental revisions was the consolidation of decision
making power at the highest possible level (the Leadership Principle). Under this
consolidation, the municipalities were forced to share many of the strong local powers
that they had held from the time of the Stein reforms (1807) and the Prussian “City
Freedom” Act of 1819. They became direct outlets for national policy and, in effect,
“trustees of the national community.”8 Local autonomy, innovation, initiative, and
experimentation all became subsidiary to national direction, national goals, and national
controls.
Concerning city planning, the municipality still held the power to plan for
housing, recreation, transportation, and land use needs as long as the municipal
approaches were not in contradiction with national, state, or regional needs.9 The
rationale for the forced realigning (Gleichschaltuung) of government powers was not
simply for efficiency or the meeting of national needs. There was also a major economic
motive; many cities across the nation were bordering on bankruptcy. In fact, the
municipal financial plight was the critical point in the new government’s justification for
its control of local functions.10 The NSDAP leaders argued that the municipalities had
not made adequate provisions for meeting local needs and that their priorities were not in
order. More succinctly, it was stated that local municipalities had been taking a “political
and financial flight from reality”. This castigation of the state of local affairs was
coupled with the wholesale replacement of 99 percent of all municipal officials and fiftyone of fifty-five large city mayors.11 The net result of the NSDAP control over local

politics was sarcastically noted in a headline of the Muncih newspaper Neueste
Nachrichten: “City Council Meetings Public Again – Throngs Rush to City Hall.”12
Ideological Perspectives
The state of the German city during the Weimar years and the responses designed
to overcome urban problems were the subjects of regular NSDAP sponsored diatribes.
The behavior of the “democratic mob”, the ineffectiveness of the “city based” Weimar
government, the art of the urban oriented avant-garde, the modernist architecture and
urban design of the Bauhaus, and the international character of the German city were all
condemned.13
The writings of the romantic ideologists of the nineteenth century provided the
antecedents for much of the anti-urban stance of the National Socialists. These writings
appear to have had particular influence upon the thoughts of Gottfried Feder and Walther
Darré, the two leading “settlement” ideologists of the Third Reich. Both men advocated
the dissolution of the industrial city and the promotion of the rural Volk as being key
steps in the creation of a truly “National-Socialist” state. Feder was quite influential in
the development of the NSDAP platform on economic, spatial, and settlement questions
prior to the Party’s assumption of power. Later, shortly after the NSDAP came to power
in 1933, he became director of the Reich Settlement Office. Through this organization he
proposed concepts that were to guide the de-urbanization of the nation. More
specifically, he advocated: (1) the halting of urban growth; (2) the dispersion of industry
away from the cities; (3) the reduction in population of urban areas; and (4) the
subjugation of all local, regional, and state planning to national needs.14
His ideas generated significant controversy. Planners saw merit in lowering the
density of urban centers and developing an alternative to the crowded rental blocks
(Mietskasernen) that blanketed the large cities. The militarists saw the ideas as helping to
neutralize the impact of enemy bombing. Others, such as Gauleiter Erich Koch of East
Prussia saw the ideas as leading to economic growth in the Prussian East.15 Ideologists
perceived them as contributing to the other hand, big business and agriculturalists, fearing
a decrease in production, objected to the ideas. Further, there was little support for the
ideas from the citizenry.
Feder enjoyed a brief period of national governmental support for his ideas at the
start of the Third Reich. However, they proved so unworkable that they were quickly
abandoned. He was removed from his position in less than one year. His ideas were
considered to be so medieval, so economically disruptive, and so unpopular with
industrialists and policy makers that Economic Minister Hjalmar Schacht removed him
from office. He was replaced by Wilhelm Ludovici, who continued to develop the new
settlement ideas but without the strident call for the elimination of urban systems and
infrastructure.
Feder’s position as the leading settlement ideologist was assumed by Walther
Darré. Darré was equally as anti-urban as Feder and argued for the strengthening of the
rural peasant at the expense of the city. However, unlike Feder, he continued to be a
powerful party and governmental official throughout the 1930s.
Neither Feder nor Darré were able to develop effective steps designed to stop the
growth and expansion of the cities. However, it should be pointed out that anti-urbanism

still remained as a critical ideological consideration in government policy. In fact,
intentional anti-urbanism was a significant ideological input in the goals of the Recovery
Years. This input could be particularly noted in settlement, agricultural expansion, and
regionalization policies.
Planning in the Recovery Years
The Beginning
The first governmental effort to stimulate an economic revival focused upon the
need to create jobs and to expand the supply of housing. The primary legislative
enactment was the Law for the Reduction of Unemployment (June 1933). This act was
comprehensive and included several elements that related to municipal planning,
including the building of 7000 kilometers of national highways (Autobahnen) and the
financing of small-scale municipally sponsored public improvement projects. (These
were cynically referred to as Pyramidenbau – the building of pyramids, or, less
euphemistically, “make work” jobs). Among these improvements were repairs to private
houses; the building of new houses; agricultural resettlement; and highway, subway,
river, rail, and road transportation improvements.16
Two other acts were also crucial in the formation of the national government’s
policies toward German cities and towns. The first was the Hereditary Farm Law of
1033. The act was intended to be the cornerstone of the creation of a permanent peasant
class. It was designed to stabilize the family farm, contribute to the creation of a strongly
nationalistic peasantry, and promote national autarchy. It also prohibited owners from
disposing of their property and restricted the inheritance of the farm to the first born son.
The second was the Act to Layout Areas for Residential Settlements (hereafter referred to
as the settlement act). This act was designed to control urban expansion, stop real estate
speculation, and expand the housing supply.17
The lack of housing represented the most critical city planning problem of the
early 1930s. Throughout the Weimar period the German cities were unable to match
housing demand, supply, and the ability of the dweller to obtain housing financing. By
1932, this problem became so severe that hundreds of thousands of units were vacant
while thousands of people were living in shacks or with extended families.18 The average
amount of housing built per year during the Weimar era was approximately 200,000
units. In the first four years of the Third Reich (1933-1936) housing supply increased to
an average of 300,000 units per year. Yet due to increased marriages, pent-up demand,
and growing families, supply still did not keep up with demand. By the start of the first
Four Year Plan, for example, demand had reached 350,000 units per year.
The settlement act was a major program in the effort to overcome the housing
problems. Over 65,000 settler homes were built under this program in the first four years
of the Third Reich. These settlements were designed to have a strong folkish orientation
and were to create an alternative to the dank, overcrowded tenement blocks. This
program included three primary settlement types: (1) the “house with farm” where the
dweller could work in both field and factory (Nebensiedlung), (2) the privately owned
home with a few acres to grow produce for personal consumption (Kleinsiedlung), and
(3) the privately owned home and garden on the urban fringe (Heimstätte). The
settlement act represented a policy extension of the Unemployment Act in that it stressed

self-help, self sufficiency, and job-creation. There was a distinct fear that the economic
depression would not be overcome and that industrial production would not return to the
levels of either the pre-war or the mid-Weimar era. Therefore, it was essential that the
state and its citizens develop their own autarchic system. This program was also intended
to reduce pressures on the city so that slum removal could be undertaken.
Both the Hereditary Farm Law and the settlement act underscored the startling
fact that a new approach to city planning was in operation. In both cases there was little
discussion of local needs and desires, little concern for local priorities, and little
involvement with traditional city planners. These two acts were designed by and for the
national government. National ideology, national settlement policies, national defense
policy, and the national response to the Depression were the key elements that
contributed to their implementation. Further, they were part of a national population
policy (Bevolkerungspolitik) that might be labeled “Imperialism by Demography”.
Included within this policy were the following: urban decentralization, resettlement of
German speaking people in newly occupied land, the solution to the living space
(Lebensraum) problem, expansion of farm production to attain increased agricultural self
sufficiency, and finally, the creation of a buffer zone for military defense purposes
between the German nation and its neighbors.19
The design and the site planning of housing also reflected national ideological
characteristics. To the party ideologists, housing was critically important as a culture
building agent. (It should be noted that Weimar planners often held a similar view). By
meeting the housing demand and providing the proper design ethos, the ideologists
perceived that a positive sense of Heimat could be created.20 This, in turn, would provide
a powerful motivation toward and reinforcement of the cultural attributes being
developed by the NSDAP. Thus, the party propaganda office developed a large scale
“selling effort”. Phrases such as “settler joy” (Siedlerfreuden), “settler prosperity”
(Siedlergluck), the “beauty of homesteading” (Schönheit des Siedelns), and folk
community (Volksgemeinschaft) became common in the popular press of the day.
Articles and photographs showing beautiful maidens working in the fields adjacent to the
new settlements or walking along rustic streets with new housing in the background
appeared with regularity.21
The most commonly perceived house design of the period was the “Hansel and
Gretel Candy Covered Cottage” type. Thousands of units were built in this image as well
as the more simple Heimatstil, Fachwerk, and Tyrolean designs.22 Exposed timbers,
exterior privies, stables, and peaked roofs were common design elements. The intention
in these designs was to create a feeling for the spirit of the past and to contribute to an
enhancement of Erman culture while meeting current shelter needs. Simplicity, tradition,
permanence, unity with land, and Heimat are descriptive terms that could apply to the
intent of these designs.23 At the same time that these designs were being advocated, there
was also a move to discredit the modernist design concepts of the Weimar period. The
stark facades, the flat roofs and the small scale of the living units were all condemned.
Yet the intentions and the results do not totally match. Thousands of housing units were
built that reflected the technological and design advances that were developed during the
Weimar years. In fact, once the rhetoric of both the avant-garde of the 1920s and the
NSDAP arbiters of culture in the 1930s is removed, there are significant design
similarities between the two periods.

The small settlement structures were to be sited differently, in theory, from the
regular orthogonal layout that had become common during the Weimar years. The
orthogonal plan was to be conceptually replaced by the circle. Only through such an
organically derived shape, it was felt, could a sense of community be derived. The intent
was to “unite people in a readiness to help and participate in community life”, and to
stimulate the feeling of the organic character of man in nature.24 This concept was a
repudiation of the rationally derived row-on-row (Zeilenbau) designs of the Weimar era
planners.25 Indeed, the National Socialist theorists perceived that the Zeilenbau treatment
oriented man toward himself, while circular designs (Kreisbildendes Prinzip), helped to
create a sense of community. In essence the circle was used to reflect the medieval
village (Burg) rather than the Castrum-like Civitas,26 and to help overcome mental
urbanization (Seelische Verstädterung). The concept was at least partially applied in
many settlements across the nation. However, as with the architectural designs, there
were also many more settlements which were based upon site planning principles that
had evolved during the Weimar years.
In sum, the ideological emphasis upon settlement design patterns generally
stressed the following points: the need for unity through building (Einigung),
romanticism, medieval settlement patterns, and the community as an arm of the state.
These characteristics were not always present. In fact, there was extensive diversity in
design concepts, site planning, and architectural styles.
The Performance
The Hereditary Farm Law accomplished little in terms of creating a permanent
peasant class. There were several reasons for this. The inability of the owners to dispose
of the land restricted the ability to mortgage it and, in turn, to buy equipment and
supplies. The lack of available land for those dispossessed by the law meant more people
were forced to move to the city for work. The farm land not covered by the act, and
hence available for sale, was too expensive for the dispossessed. Also, NSDAP members
had first priority in buying this land. Lastly, the large Junker estates were exempt from
the act and were kept in their current ownership. The net result was that the farmer did
not become more rooted to the soil and the ruralite movement to the city continued with
little impediment.
The settlement act was not as extensive a failure as the Hereditary Farm Law but
it, too, did not meet expectations. In particular, it accomplished little in stopping the
migration of residents to the city. Only in the university cities of Heidelberg, Münster,
and Bonn was there a net decline in urban population.27 In effect, by 1934, there was an
urban population boom that came close to matching the record of the 1890s. The
government, noting its inability to influence where growth would occur, began to
reconsider its position as a subsidizer of small settlements. In 1935, it decided to stop
subsidizing these programs altogether.28
The settlement act did result in the building of thousands of dwelling units during
the Recovery Years. In this regard, it could be considered as being successful. It also
could be considered successful in that it established a three-tiered land planning system
that integrated local, regional, and national planning goals. However, upon further
analysis, the system was not as simple as it first appeared. At the national level, decision-

making was spread among the Ministries of Labor (settlement planning), Agriculture
(rural settlement planning), and Economics (small settlements). It was not until 1935 that
land use planning began to function in a coordinated and effective manner. At that time,
land use was consolidated under the National Bureau of Spatial Planning.29 With control
over national, regional, and local land use plans, its key responsibilities included
population resettlement, industrial location, the planning of transportation networks, soil
improvements, and defense preparedness.
The responsibilities of the bureau were carried out within a strong ideological
framework. In fact, the head of the organization, Minister Hans Kerrl, included the
“increase of the biological folkish-strength” as being one of its aims.30 Inherent in the
mandate of this organization were the concepts of Lebensraum and Geopolitik.31 Fritz
Schumacher, former city planning director of Hamburg, saw these ideas as being the
result of a new conceptualization of space that had been stimulated by both technological
advances and by the national border constrictions imposed upon the nation by the Treaty
of Versailles.32 Space had become a weapon in the struggle for national existence. It was
interpreted in terms of spirituality, nature, land, settlement, and community. Space
determination was to be the overriding means of creating a sense of national unity and
community.33
The next level below the National Bureau of Spatial Organization consisted of
twenty-three regional planning organizations that covered the entire nation. Modeled
after the much-heralded Ruhr Regional District, these organizations were responsible for
developing the plans that evolved from national policies and directives. Beneath these
organizations were the local municipal planning agencies which implemented the plans
and administered controls within their own boundaries. Their responses, in turn, were
closely monitored and tightly controlled by both the regional agencies and the Bureau.
National Involvement in Municipal Planning
The city proper was not initially a direct focus of national government attention
during the recovery years. However, as the period moved toward its end, the national
government began increasingly to focus upon urban revitalization activities. In fact, there
was an apparent correlation between the relative prosperity of the nation and the national
government’s interest in urban centers; as the nation prospered and the need for consumer
goods and industrial production rose, the city became increasingly more important to the
national government.
The national leadership saw the city as having both economic and symbolic
functions. The economic functions included job creation and the financial spin-off that
could be gained from the new structures. In terms of serving a symbolic function, the
city was to be the place where the true glory of the new state could be found. The new
structures – in combination with the flags, sculptures, music, and masses of people –
were to contribute to the reinforcement of a new national spirit.34 This spirit, in turn, was
to serve as the basis for the formation of a “community of the people”. In one sense,
from a national perspective, the city was viewed as an inanimate architectural space that
was to be a crucible in which support for the state was nurtured.35 This perspective
becomes clear when one examines the plans that were designed under National Socialist
auspices. The greatest emphasis was upon the construction of urban squares, plazas,

monuments, and public buildings. Largely emphasizing neoclassical designs, these
structures were designed to reflect such feelings as awe, permanence, and strength.
These designs emerged as a result of the party leadership’s belief that the lack of
monumentality in civic structures was symptomatic of the cultural debasement of the
nation: “stone monuments”, based upon the party’s ideological stances, were to
contribute toward correcting the problem.36
Nowhere was monumentality as important as in Nürnberg and Berlin. In
Nürnberg, the “city of the party rallies”, extensive planning effort was placed on creating
spaces that would allow for the magnanimity of the party events to emerge.37 It was to
create a setting where the nation (and the world) could perceive the political, communal,
and military strength of the nation. Rhetorical descriptions of the period included such
phrases as “proof of German strength and will”, “a shrine for the nation”, and “on these
grounds, the communal experience of the unity of Führer and Volk was possible”.38
The plan for Berlin was intended to serve as the guide for the creation of the
capital of the new Empire (Reichshauptstadt).39 The monumental scale that was being
built into Nürnberg was surpassed in Berlin. The Great Hall, the Arch of Triumph, the
Soldiers Hall, and the North and South Railroad Stations, among others, were to be some
of the most massive structures in the world to that time. To illustrate the scale, St. Peter’s
Cathedral would have fit several times over into the proposed Great Hall. Further, the
Arch of Triumph was to be forty-nine times larger than the Arc de Triomphe in Paris.
The planning for Berlin was entrusted by Hitler to the architect Albert Speer. He
reported directly to Hitler and was given extensive funds and staff to accomplish his
tasks. The planning of Berlin, as with Nürnberg, was mainly carried out during the First
Four Year Plan.
It is interesting to note how the national government was able to gain the power to
supersede the local plans of both Nürnberg and Berlin. In the Nürnberg case, in 1935,
Hitler expressed grave concern for the people of Nürnberg – particularly because his plan
required the relocation of the city zoo. He therefore asked Mayor Willi Liebel for his
support and volunteered to pay all relocation costs. Speer analyzed Hitler’s approach as
follows:
Two years later Hitler would come directly to the point in dealing with a mayor:
Here is the Party Rally Area; this is how we’re going to do it. But at that time, in 1935, he did not
yet feel so completely in command and so spent almost an hour on prefatory explanations before
he placed any sketch on the table.40

By 1936, Hitler had begun to take action independently of the local city’s position. Such
was the case with the planning of Berlin. Throughout most of the Recovery Years, the planning
for Berlin was controlled by the city administration. During that period, Hitler presented several
ideas to Mayor Julius Lippert concerning the remaking of the city into the Reichshauptstadt.
Lippert was not overly enthusiastic about Hitler’s plans. Hitler first threatened to relocate the
capital and then simply decided to by-pass all government agencies and turn the planning over to
Albert Speer, his new General Building Inspector. His actions in this case illustrate the power of
the leadership principle. When the city was not supportive of national needs or policies, its
freedom to act or react on planning matters was simply removed. In this case, the national
government stripped the Mayor of Berlin, the Berlin City Council, the Governor of Greater
Berlin, and the national Ministry of the Interior of all planning powers concerning the capital, and
turned the power over to the General Building Inspection Office.

Nürnberg and Berlin were not the only cities scheduled to receive extensive planning
assistance from the national government. Among others, Munich (the capital of the movement),
Hamburg (the city of foreign trade), and Linz were also programmed to be the recipients of
extensive national planning assistance. Labeled as “reconstruction cities”, each was to house
national government and party offices and institutions.41 Further, each was to have its core area
substantially changed to reflect the ideologies of the new order.42
Few of the proposed structures were actually built during the recovery years. Yet those
that were built constituted dramatic announcements that the new design approaches and
ideological concepts were being applied. This could be particularly noted in the designs for
Nürnberg’s Zeppelinfeld and Congress Hall, Munich’s House of German Art, and Berlin’s
Olympic Stadium.43 These design and planning concepts captured the imagination of governor
(Gaulieter) after governor who, in time, attempted to apply them in their own cities. In time, the
plans proposed for Berlin came to be rigid models for cities across the nation.44 In sum, the cities
became more and more important to the nation-state as the Recovery Years came to a close.

Other Activities
The emphasis upon solving the problems of housing overshadowed all other
traditional planning activities during the Recovery Years. Relatively few cultural or
recreational facilities were built. Industrial and commercial activities were rarely
expanded due to existing excess capacity. While long range planning activities addressed
these functions, they were low priorities until the First Four Year Plan. Concerning
highways, as mentioned earlier, extensive work was undertaken during the Recovery
Years. The national highway system (Autobahnen), proposed since the early 1920s, was
planned and implemented. This system represented the most significant technological
advance of the period, and it fulfilled several needs. First, it provided a psychological
and functional connection among the nation’s large cities. Secondly, it expanded the
commuting catchment area. In essence, the city and its Hinterland became more closely
bound. This then enabled a feasible expansion of the previously mentioned Heimstätte
concept. Thirdly, it provided thousands of jobs for formerly unemployed laborers.
Lastly, and perhaps of the greatest national significance, it served a military objective by
providing a means of rapid deployment to the potential fronts surrounding the nation.
The Recovery Years in Perspective
City planning during the recovery years was marked by several unique
characteristics. The leadership principle, “imperialism by demography”, and the antiurban ideologies stimulated a refocusing of objectives, priorities, and methods. At the
same time, these changes co-existed with a strong sense of pragmatism which
emphasized an economic revival and an expansion of the housing supply. It is clear that
the end results of these nationally imposed policies were not totally dissimilar to those of
the previous period. In fact, in terms of the implementation of city plans, whenever
ideology and economic pragmatism were in conflict, the latter appears to have taken
precedence as a controlling influence.

Planning in the First Four Year Plan (1935-1940)
Where Fits the City?
If the recovery years can be considered the “time of ideological ruralization” then
the First Four Year Plan must be considered the “time of the city”.45
The most significant stimulus toward a shift to urban concerns came from the
military. In fact, a concern for military power was inherent in most major policy
decisions affecting Germany. As early as 1935 one could begin to note the change. In
that year, an act was passed giving the military the right to expropriate any land that it
needed.46 At the same time, an increasingly large share of the Gross National Product
(GNP) was shifted to military needs. (The economist Guillebaud labeled the shift as
being “guns instead of houses”).47
The results of this shift were felt in virtually all sectors of German life, including
city planning. It could be noted in several ways. First, the military required large masses
of land for training bases. This land was primarily agricultural. The net result was that
gross farm acreage began to decline. Second, the military needed large supplies of
technical material and manufactured goods. The places where they could be produced
were in the industrial districts of the cities. This caused a large influx of people to these
areas seeking defense-related employment. The net result of this shift in priorities was
that rural residents were moving to the city at a rate of 2.5 percent per year. (This
compares with 1.5 percent during the Weimar years). While the existence of these jobs
was a strong pull, it should also be pointed out that the typical urban worker earned 50
percent more in wages than his rural counterpart.48 Lastly, the shift to a military focus
caused the national government to make housing a lower priority. This shift, in turn,
resulted in an extensive ripple effect that spread throughout the nation. On a primary
level, it meant continued dependence on the over-crowded center cities which meant that
slum removal had to be delayed.49 Several developments point out the severity of the
impact of the decision to shift away from housing: (1) housing became a black market
item, (2) one million slum units continued to exist in the central core, (3) 35 percent of all
families lacked suitable housing, and (4) housing construction fell increasingly short of
the needed supply.50
The change in priorities also resulted in a shift away from ruralization. How
could the government support a ruralization policy when industrial, technical,
transportation, and military needs had precedence? The net result was that the NSDAP
rural policies of the recovery years were virtually ignored. More farms were established
during the Weimar years of 1925-32 than under National Socialist rule between 1932 and
1939. Further, the farm population had become so depleted by 1939 that an agricultural
mobilization program had to be developed.51
The Urban Core
Three phenomena emerge from the national government’s influence on core area
city planning during the First Four Year Plan. First, in the center cities, housing and
recreation/culture – two of the key basic city planning functions noted in the Athens
Charter of 1933 – were of little direct interest to the national leaders. (Interestingly, as
previously noted, there was national interest for housing outside the core city). Secondly,

for a nation that stressed its rootedness in the soil, it seemed quite strange that nationally
supported projects in the city placed virtually no emphasis upon greenery. In fact, nature
(trees, shrubs, grass) was removed from Munich’s Königsplatx, Berlin’s Lustgarten
facing Schinkel’s Museum, and the square in front of the Berlin Technical University in
order to enhance a feeling of “community”.52 Similar squares were to be placed in cities
across the nation. Thirdly, the concept of symbolism in design continued to thrive
despite a general decline in the importance of ideology. Regardless of its size, each
community was to have a central structural focal point (Stadtkrone) that was designed to
enhance the state. While many plans were created, very few were implemented. They
were costly and required scarce building resources and manpower skills. The planning of
core area projects virtually ceased in late 1939. At that time the shift to a wartime
economy forced the implementation program to be delayed.
New Towns: Practice and Theory
There was also a national effort to create new towns during the First Four Year
Plan. These towns were primarily intended to aid in enlarging the resource extraction
base of the nation, to expand its industrial capability, and to stimulate economic growth
in “backwater” areas. Only two were actually started. These were the “Town of the
Hermann Goering–Werke” at Salzgitter and the “Strength Through Joy Automobile
Town” at Wolfsburg.
The Goering-Werke was to be an ideal, highly structured National Socialist
community. Proposed ultimately to house 300,000 people, it was originally designed
with an elaborate Stadtkrone at its center. Housing was located in satellite areas and was
to be connected to work places by high-speed autobahns. It was never fully implemented
but was, in part, adapted to postwar conditions. Now called Salzgitter, it houses over
30,000 people.53
The other totally new effort was the “Strength Through Joy Automobile Town”.
Hitler, very early in his regime, became enamored with the idea of a “people’s” car. He
commissioned the automotive engineer Ferdinand Porsche to develop this vehicle and in
1934 the basic design was ready. Hitler then decreed that a new plant and city be built in
the underpopulated, underdeveloped, northern hinterland. Declaring that the city would
be “one of the happiest and most beautiful in the world”, he laid the cornerstone in 1939
of what was to be another model for a fascist new town. Under the planning direction of
Peter Kolb and advisorship of Albert Speer, the design was dramatically imperialist in
scope. It was to have been dominated by an acropolis consisting of party buildings,
theater, great hall, and cultural center. This complex was never built. The town did
begin to take shape during the Third Reich, but the makeshift housing and barracks-like
atmosphere did not meet the expectations of the master plan. The original plan was
modified in the postwar period, and only then did the Volkswagen city of Wolfsburg, as
it is now called, take form.54
The End
The remilitarization of the Rhineland, the annexation of Austria, and the seizure
of Czechoslovakia called for the supremacy of military needs above all else. Thus, the

capital improvement projects were placed in abeyance. Housing, more than any other
city planning program, was the greatest victim of military domination. In fact, housing
starts had declined to 138,000 units by 1940. In order to quiet growing concern over the
lack of housing, the government announced a comprehensive housing program that
would start upon the end of the war. The houses were to be “airy, sun-filled and set in
gardens”. This program was greeted with great cynicism by the populace. A sarcastic
observation concerning this announcement, made by Germans who had been victimized
by bombing, concluded, “Well, now we really have houses with plenty of light, air and
sunshine”.55
Summary
The National Socialist government was an active participant in local city
planning. The bureaucratic relationships were restructured so that the cities came
increasingly under national government domination. National planning efforts initially
focused upon resettlement concepts within a strong anti-urban context, and were intended
to halt urban growth and decentralize the population. These efforts stressed the
development of small family farm settlements and emphasized self-sufficiency. Initially,
the designs reflected folkish beliefs but they rapidly moved to a wider selection of
approaches.
The most extensive community assistance efforts were made during the recovery
years. The heavy welfare burden, unemployment, and lack of housing inherited by the
National Socialist government prompted swift action. The First Four Year Plan reflected
the rising spectre of militarism. Public services and funds were regularly placed second
to defense considerations. In spite of this, city planning efforts were still undertaken to
create cultural, governmental, and political structures and spaces. These reflected the
ideological values of glorification of the state, cultural permanence, and strength. Efforts
were also undertaken to create new communities. In summary, however, city planning
became less and less important to the national government as the decade came to a close.
Comparisons of the Weimar Republic era with the National Socialist times often
characterize the former as being urban oriented while the latter is characterized as rural
oriented. Although, as noted above, there was an overt anti-urban stance taken by the
National Socialist theorists, the stances of planning theorists during Weimar times are
less clear. Sibyl Moholy-Nagy has labeled the theorists as focusing upon a Weichbild or
“grey area” that was neither urban nor rural.56 The historian Manfredo Tafuri, on the
other hand, considers the Weimar theorists as being anti-urban.57
It is clear that none of the Weimar city planners focused upon the city as an ideal
form. Rather, they emphasized escapist, small scale, limited size, balanced communities
that were placed in a green belt. These theorists felt that the city was too complex, too
disorderly, too traditional, and too unchangeable. For these reasons they advocated a new
form of community. This new form, in theory, would simplify the complexity of the
community experience, bring order to the community form, and reflect a new
Gesamtkultur or Wohnkultur.
The conceptualization of new community forms by the Weimar theorists did not
reflect an overt dislike or hatred of cities. Neither did it ascribe medieval characteristics
to the people who were to reside in the new communities. However, the theorists did see

the need to decentralize, to recognize, and to create new non-urban communities. To this
end, the greatest emphasis of the Weimar era theorists lay in alternatives to the
overcrowded, Mietskasernen dominated, center city. Eventually, similar views were
advocated by the NSDAP theorists as well.
The National Socialist theorists took on extremely anti-urban stances during the
recovery years. They argued for the rejection of urban life and the creation of the ordered
city of the middle ages. Yet once the rhetoric is removed, the approaches advocated by
NSDAP theorists do not differ strongly from those of the Weimar era. Both called for
small settlements, for alternatives to urban living, for settlements that offered “field and
factory”, and for the use of designs and site plans as symbols for the new era. The key
difference lay in the fact that the National Socialists advocated these changes as part of a
nationally controlled program designed to further the objectives of the nation-state.
Local autonomy, innovation, experimentation, and cultural views were not tolerated as
much as they were during the Weimar period.
The central cities were of secondary importance both to the Weimar governments
and to the National Socialist government through the recovery years. In both cases, the
emphasis was upon developing the urban fringe. Only after the housing shortages were
overcome was attention to be focused upon the center cities. Since neither the Weimar
nor NSDAP governments met this goal, the urban centers remained ignored except for
some transportation changes, some efforts to protect the medieval character of existing
cities, and some selected model urban renewal projects.58 The military and employment
requirements that surfaced in the First Four Year Plan brought a refocusing of objectives
on the part of the NSDAP to an urban orientation. Once this happened, extensive plans
were developed for selected cities. However, few of these were ever implemented.
National efforts under the NSDAP to stimulate, guide, and control urban planning
have had a long term impact upon city planning in West Germany. On the positive side,
the decentralization of cities, the idea of building controlled settlements within
agricultural areas, and the creation of the Autobahnen are all considered to have been
quite beneficial. The negative aspects are more indirect. In fact, they relate more to the
question of planning itself as opposed to what planning does. For example, Hans Arndt
has written that the bitter memory of the national planning effort undertaken by the
National Socialists is so vivid as to make the very idea of national planning an
anathema.59 The architectural historian Wolfgang Pehnt has reinforced this view: “Any
planning measure is regarded with distrust ….” Instead of democratizing the planning
procedures and replacing poor with better planning, it is planning as such that is
condemned.60 This negative feeling presently exists. A concern over national usurpation
of local powers and initiative is still strong at all levels of government. One net result of
this is that the experience of nationally guided planning will not likely be repeated again
in Germany.
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